The Covid -19 pandemic has taken many lives and threatens many more, prompting an unprecedented policy response across the globe , generally intended to slow the spread of the virus and ‘flatten out the curve’ by reducing the risk of a short term spike in hospitalisations overwhelming the health system. Many economies, although not all, are in various forms of lockdown and the economic impact will be severe, to an extent impossible to quantify with any degree of certainty, although in some cases data is now emerging which allows economists to make a stab at the impact.
Crucially though, a question which cannot be answered at this stage is how long the hit to economic activity will last. Stock markets have plummeted but the scale of the fall to date implies that investors are betting on a V shaped recession i.e. a very sharp fall in activity for a couple of quarters, followed by a rapid recovery at least approaching pre-crisis levels.That also seems to be the consensus view in terms of US analysts, with Goldman Sachs, for example, projecting a 1.5% fall in GDP in the first quarter, followed by a 6% decline in q2 and then a 3% rise in q3 and q4 . That leaves the average fall in US GDP in 2020 at -3.8%, with a projected rise in the unemployment rate to around 9% from the current 3.6%.
The same V pattern appears to be underpinning expectations in the Euro Area (EA), although again the fall in annual GDP is huge. Germany. for example, appears to be predicating its fiscal response to the crisis on a 5% fall in GDP. The March PMI for the EA (31.4) does provide sime guidance, with the average for the first quarter implying a 0.7% decline in q1 GDP, followed by around 2.7% in q2 if the PMI figure averages around 30 over the next few months. A 0.5% decline in q3 followed by a 1.5% bounce in q4 would leave the average fall in EA GDP in 2020 at 2.5%.
In Ireland’ case the PMI indices do not correlate highly with recorded GDP but in any case we do not have a March reading anyway so we have little to go on in estimating the economic impact of the virus on the economy. Assuming a V shaped recession, however, with heroic assumptions on the scale of very steep falls in non-food domestic spending till June, yields a €10bn (9% )drop in consumption and a €15bn (8%) drop in modified domestic demand in 2020, assumimg a modest recovery in the latter part of the year.A similar percentage fall in private sector employment would push the average unemployment rate up to 12%. The impact on overall GDP largely depends on exports, however, including contract manufacturing, which amounts to some €70bn, with most originating in China. A collapse in that figure could throw up an enormous fall in recorded GDP but again if we assume that V shape for exports as a whole the overall fall in fall in GDP is around 5%, which would be less than half the slump recorded during the financial crash because it would be short and sharp rather than over two years.
How long the recessions will last depends on the path of the virus and how quickly activity returns to ‘normal’ which are unknowns of course. So a U shaped cycle is certainly possible, with any material recovery in spending and output pushed out from two to say four quarters. That would clearly render the above estimates very optimistic and pose big choices for governments in terms of fiscal supports designed to be short-lived.
Finally, there is also the prospect that the virus takes much longer to pass through the population and that the return to ‘normal’ patterns of social and economic activity does not occur for a prolonged period, giving an L shaped cycle i.e. any upturn takes well over a year to eighteen months to materialise. Clearly that would result in much steeper falls in equity markets than seen to date, much larger increases in unemployment, massive credit issues and much larger fiscal hits to governments. Of course we have seen unprecedented levels of policy response on the monetary side, designed to pump liquidity into the system and limit the scale of any rise in long term borrowing cost for governments. Media headlines have also highlighted huge fiscal ‘stimulus’ packages but to date most of this relates to State guarantees for bank loans, which may carry fiscal implications down the line but is effectively monetary in seeking to supply credit to the business sector. Nonetheless, we have also seen governments now also turning to more direct measures , including enhanced unemployment assistance and in some cases, including Ireland, wage support. As yet these massive increases in fiscal deficits are seen to be financed by borrowing rather than money creation, albeit with the resumption of QE in many cases meaning that the private sector will not be alone in buying the debt.