Survey data has pointed to weaker global activity for some time now, notably in manufacturing, but the hard data surprised to the upside in the first quarter, with world growth an anualised 3.3% from 2.75% in the final quarter of 2018. Markets are increasingly nervous , however, fearing that the deterioration in US/China relations will have a much more serious impact on global trade than seen to date. The flight from risk has seen chunky falls in equity and commodity markets while the 10-year German bond yield is trading at -20bp, with the corresponding yield on US Treasuries falling from 3% to 2.10%.
Part of that latter decline can be attributed to a substantial change in expectations about monetary policy, with the futures market currently priced for a Fed Funds rate of 1.85% by year-end, from the current 2.40%. US growth appears to have slowed in the second quarter (the Atlanta Fed model is tracking an annualised 1.2% from over 3% in q1)) but to date there is little to suggest that the States is slowing sharply enough to warrant that kind of easing. That could change, of course, and some at the Fed are already concerned about inflation being a little low particularly given the strength of the labour market.The FOMC also appears to be giving more weight to global factors in its policy deliberations, despite the fact that the US is a relatively closed economy in terms of external trade, and to financial conditions, notably the stock market.
The Fed had already announced that it will stop reducing the size of its balance sheet and clearly has some room to cut short term rates, which contrasts with the ECB, as the latter has not been able to tighten policy despite a prolonged recovery in economic activity in the Euro area, and facing into a possible downturn with a zero refinancing rate and a negative deposit rate.
The Governing Council in Frankfurt was confident last year that the tightening labour market would push up wage inflation and ultimately price inflation but has been forced to consistenly revise down forecasts of core inflation. Consequently, the first suggestion of monetary tightening, based on forward guidance signalling a likely rate rise around September this year, was then modified to the end of 2019 but that too looks redundant given that market rates now only imply a 10bp rate rise from current levels in early 2022. Indeed market rates are now priced to go modestly lower still over the next year.
The failure of the ECB’s various policy tools to generate underlying inflation anywhere near target prompts the obvious question as to what the Governing Council can do now, particularly if growth slows sharply. Another round of cheap long term loans to banks is likely and forward guidance will no doubt be extended but banks are awash with liquidity as it stands, while the negative deposit rate is hurting bank profits, a fact acknowledged of late by the ECB, as well as sending a signal to the population at large that we are still in an economic crisis, despite tha fact that unemployment across the zone has just fallen to levels last seen in 2008. Another round of asset purchases is also a possibility, although that may face tricky issues around the Capital key and the Bank’s already high ownership share of some government bond markets.
The broader debate about whether monetary policy can be effective at or near the lower bound in rates, alongside scepticism about the impact of QE on consumer prices (as opposed to asset prices) has prompted renewed interest in fiscal policy , having fallen out of favour in mainstram economic thinking over recent decades.
Some economists now argue that the low rate environment changes the cost/ benefit equation in favour of expansionary fiscal policy. The case is that in many countries the average interest rate on the debt is now below the growth rate of GDP, so on standard debt dynamics a government could run a primary deficit and still put downward pressure on the debt ratio, A more radical strand, based on Modern Monetary Theory, argues that for any country with full monetary sovereignty ( i.e. it can print its own money) a debt default can only occur as a policy choice and that there is no great reason why such countries should not run budger deficits to boost employment or to achieve other socially useful goals, paid for by printing the money rather than through higher taxes or issuing bonds.
The latter approach has many mainstream critics but is not applicable anyway in the euro zone ( no member state can print euros) while the ECB will no doubt argue it has not run out of policy options. One radical approach discussed in academic circles is for Central Banks to adopt a more flexible inflation target or even a range and Draghi himself has stated that the ECB’s inflation target is not a short term ceiling, implying a tolerance for above target inflation for a while. This emphasis on expectations in determining inflation perhaps puts too much weight on that component and low inflation may owe far more to structural factors such a globalisation, free trade (to date at least ) and a much lower equilibrium real rate of interest, so rendering a 2% inflation target as unachievable anyway, let alone a higher inflation rate.
In fact fiscal policy in the euro area is already set to be a litle more expansionary this year anyway, but in the event of an outright recession we are likely to see much more aggresive fiscal expansion across the zone, albeit without a public acknowledgement that policy makers in the EA erred in recent years in making monetary policy, and hence the ECB, the only player in town.